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PUTTING THE SPECTER OF DOUBLE COUNTING TO REST:
HOW PUBLIC LAW 112-99 RESOLVES THE ISSUE OF
DOUBLE COUNTING IN CONCURRENT COUNTERVAILING
AND NON-MARKET ECONOMY ANTIDUMPING
INVESTIGATIONS
Stephanie E. Hartmann
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Commerce (the DOC) has faced
considerable criticism for the way it implements trade remedies. 1
Although U.S. trade laws2 are almost identical to the texts of the most
important international agreements, 3 the DOC’s implementation of the
laws differs from most countries. The DOC’s implementation processes
that lead to so-called “double counting,” are some of the most
controversial.4
Double counting arises in the market economy (ME) context when
countervailing duties (CVDs) and antidumping duties (ADs) are
concurrently applied to remedy an export subsidy. 5 The concurrent
application of these two duties causes double counting because the
calculation of the dumping margin in the AD investigation also
incorporates the impact of an export subsidy.6 This process assumes that
the subsidy is passed through the recipient manufacturer to reduce export
prices, rendering at least part of the concurrent AD duties double
counted.7
In the ME context, double counting is only problematic if the



1
See Lauren W. Clarke, Note, The Market-Oriented Enterprise Approach: The Best Responses
to the Questionable United States Trade Practices Scrutinized in GPX International Tire Corp. v.
United States, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 837 (2011); Christopher Blake McDaniel, Sailing the Seas
of Protectionism: The Simultaneous Application of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties to
Nonmarket Economies—An Affront to Domestic and International Laws, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
741, 742 (2009-2010); Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology under U.S. AntiDumping Laws: A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J.
81, 81 (2006).
2
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. § 2501 (1979); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1979).
3
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT
1994]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.doc (last
visited Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
4
See PHILIP BENTLEY & AUBREY SILBERSTON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING ACTION:
LIMITS IMPOSED BY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL THEORY 8 (2007) (“[D]iversity is a prevalent
characteristic of the way anti-dumping and countervailing action is taken by different WTO member
countries.”); McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742.
5
See BENTLEY & SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 31.
6
Id.
7
Id.

SUMMER 2014

Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest

subsidy is an export subsidy. This is because a domestic subsidy affects
export and domestic pricing equally.8 As a result, the subsidy should not
give rise to a difference between export prices and domestic prices.9
The phenomenon of double counting in the ME context, where there
are concurrent AD and CVD investigations involving export subsidies
has long been recognized, is addressed in Article VI:5 of the GATT
1994. This Article prohibits the concurrent application of ADs and CVDs
that compensate for the same situation of dumping or export
subsidization.10
Double counting arises in the non-market economy (NME) context
when there is a domestic subsidy, as opposed to an export subsidy.11
This is attributable to the unique nature of the NME AD methodology the
DOC applies, which uses either surrogate country factors of production
or prices to estimate the normal value of a similar product. 12 The
development of a double counting issue in the NME context is a
relatively recent and controversial phenomenon. Historically, the DOC
did not conduct CVD investigations when the exporting country was a
NME country.13 This was a result of the difficulties involved in isolating
countervailable subsidies from general economic central planning.14
The policy of not applying CVDs to NME countries changed, with
respect to the People’s Republic of China (China), in 2006.15 That year
the DOC determined that China’s economy was sufficiently market-like
to apply CVDs.16 In spite of this transition to treating China as a ME
country for the purpose of CVD investigations, the DOC has persisted in
applying the NME AD methodology in investigations and administrative
reviews involving China. 17 It is this inconsistent treatment that
potentially gives rise to duplicative remedies for which the DOC is


8

Id.
Id.
10
GATT 1994, supra note 3; see BENTLEY & SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 30–31. The DOC
makes an automatic adjustment for double remedies in concurrent investigations of export subsidies
in ME countries, because an export subsidy is assumed to result in a lower export price, because it
creates an incentive for export sales over domestic sales. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645
F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1241 n.9 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(2006).
11
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677. The NME AD methodology is itself controversial because it typically
results in duties that are significantly higher than those calculated using the ME methodology,
thereby incentivizing overuse in the interest of protectionism. See generally BENTLEY &
SILBERSTON, supra note 4, at 19. This incentive is due to the use of surrogate country data, the
application of the country-wide rate of facts available and the drawing of adverse inferences in
choosing among the available facts. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-231, U.S.CHINA TRADE: ELIMINATING NON MARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES FOR SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 12–13, 22 (2006).
12
Id.
13
See GPX, 645 F. Supp .2d at 1236; James P. Durling, Encountering Rocky Shoals:
Application of the CVD Law to China, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE, 2010 WL 956090, at *1–2 (Feb. 25 2010).
14
Id.
15
See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China,
72 Fed. Reg. 43,591(Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 6, 2007) (initiation of AD invest.).
9
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routinely criticized.18
While the DOC has been heavily criticized for its concurrent
application of CVD and NME AD remedies with respect to China, the
statute Congress passed authorizing the DOC to apply CVDs to NME
countries and requiring the DOC to consider the potential for duplicative
remedies effectively addresses the problem of double counting.
However, the potential for duplicative remedies in concurrent NME AD
and CVD investigations depends entirely on whether the NME AD
methodology fully accounts for both dumping and the impact of a
domestic subsidy.19 This is highly dependent on whether the recipient of
the countervailable domestic subsidy, typically a foreign manufacturer,
uses the subsidy to lower prices. 20 Additionally, the DOC’s
implementation of the statute demonstrates that the hotly contested issue
of duplicative remedies is a nullity in terms of the scope of remedies
applied.
Antidumping laws address price discrimination by providing relief to
domestic industries that have been or are threatened by the adverse
impact of imports sold in the U.S. market at prices shown to be less than
fair market value.21 U.S. AD laws22 permit The DOC to impose duties if
the International Trade Administration (ITA) of The DOC determines
that foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the U.S. at
less than fair value. 23 Furthermore, the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) considers whether an industry24 in the United States
is materially injured, threatened with material injury, or that the
establishment of an industry is materially retarded due to non-negligible
imports of the subject merchandise.25
Countervailing duty laws combat subsidization by providing relief to
domestic industries that have been or are threatened with the adverse
impact of illegally subsidized imported goods that can be sold at lower
prices than similar goods produced in the United States.26 These laws27


18

See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742.
See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. (“The NME AD statute overlaps with the functioning of
the CVD statute . . . Thus, the AD and CVD law when applied to NME countries both work to
correct government distortion of market prices”).
20
Id.
21
Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedies: A Primer, in Trade Remedies 1, 3 (Alan B. Tippton &
Charles M. Roylton eds., 2008).
22
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. § 2501(1979); see also Antidumping Agreement supra note 3.
23
Dumping or selling at less than fair value is defined as selling a product in the U.S. at a price
that is less than the price for which a like product is sold in the home market, the normal value, after
adjustments for differences in merchandise, quantities purchased, and circumstances of sale. 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677 (2006).
24
The ITC must first define the domestic like product and the domestic industry. Id. § 1677
25
Id. § 1673. See Jones, supra note 21, at 1. Negligible imports are imports from the country
subject to investigation that account for less than 3% of the volume of all such merchandise imported
into the U.S. in the most recent 12-month period. 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
26
See Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration
of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 507, 533–534 (1989-1990);
Jones, supra note 21, at 3. This is referred to as the ‘entitlement’ model. Diamond, supra, at 517.
Alternative theories on the justification for countervailing duties include deterrence (see id. at 525)
19
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authorize The DOC to impose duties if the ITA finds that the
government, or any public entity of a foreign country, has provided a
countervailable subsidy28 for the manufacture, production, or export of
the merchandise, and if the ITC determines that a U.S. industry has
suffered injury as a result.29 Both AD and CVD investigations may be
initiated by interested parties,30 either on behalf of a domestic industry,31
or by the ITA on its own initiative.32
This paper discusses how the issue of double counting has been
addressed in U.S. case law and at the WTO. This paper also evaluates
whether, under The DOC’s current implementation of U.S. trade law, the
U.S. is in compliance with its international obligations. Section II
explains the background and implementation of the U.S. AD and CVD
statutes. Section III examines the treatment of double remedies in U.S.
case law. Section IV analyzes the WTO panel and Appellate Body
(“AB”) decisions in US–AD/ CVD. Section V addresses the statute
recently passed by Congress following the GPX case and U.S. AD and
CVD cases, and explains how The DOC’s implementation of the statute
adequately addresses potentially duplicative remedies. Finally, Section
VI discusses the relevance of the sun setting provision in China’s
Accession Protocol to the WTO and the impact it has on the issue of
double counting.


and the correction of market distortions. See id. at 515–516; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 445 (1978). It is not clear that any of these models adequately explain the
DOC’s methodology of enforcing U.S. CVD laws. See Diamond, supra, at 532–533, 540.
27
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2006), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. § 2501 (1979). See also SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at 14.
28
A subsidy is countervailable if there is a financial contribution that confers a benefit to the
specific enterprise or industry under investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006); see also SCM
Agreement, supra note 3, at 14. There are three types of countervailable subsidies: export, import
substitution, and domestic. The first two categories are defined by statute as being specific, and
therefore countervailable; for domestic subsidies the DOC must apply a ‘specificity’ test to
determine if the subsidy is countervailable. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006).
29
Jones, supra note 21, at 1. The injury determination is only necessary if the exporting country
is a party to the WTO Subsidies Agreement or has entered into a similar agreement with or assumed
similar obligations with respect to the U.S. Id. at 7.
30
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2006). Interested parties are defined as a manufacturer,
producer, or wholesaler in the U.S. of a domestic like product; a certified or recognized union or
group of workers that is representative of the industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or
wholesale in the U.S. of a domestic like product; a trade or business association, a majority of whose
members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a domestic like product in the U.S.; an association of
firms, unions, or trade associations; and, in cases involving processed agricultural products, a
collation or trade association representative of processors, or processors and producers, or processors
and growers. Id. § 1677.
31
The petition must be supported by a majority of the domestic industry, such that the workers
or producers supporting the petition represent at least 25% of the total production of the domestic
like product and account for more than 50% of the production of the domestic like product produced
by that portion of the industry supporting or opposing the petition. Id. §§ 1671, 1673. If the petition
to initiate antidumping or countervailing duties does not establish support of domestic producers or
workers accounting for more than 50% of total production of the domestic like product, the DOC is
to poll the industry to establish support. Id. §§ 1671, 1673.
32
See id. §§ 1671, 1673.
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II. BACKGROUND: HOW THE AD AND CVD STATUTES WORK
Trade remedy laws are intended to ensure that domestic industries
are not injured by unfair foreign competition in the domestic market.33
The DOC applies ADs and CVDs to offset unfair competitive advantages
attributable to foreign price discrimination and subsidization. 34
Advocates of the United States’ trade remedies policy claim these
measures are necessary to mitigate the adverse impact of various trade
practices on domestic industries and workers. 35 On the other hand,
opponents allege ADs and CVDs are little more than poorly disguised
acts of protectionism.36
In initial AD investigations and subsequent administrative reviews,
The DOC utilizes different methodologies depending on whether the
exporting country is a ME country or a NME country.37 Under the ME
AD methodology, The DOC calculates the dumping margin by
comparing the like product when destined for consumption in the
exporting country 38 with the export price. 39 Under the NME AD



33
IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, IMPORT
ADMINISTRATION ANTIDUMPING MANUAL 3 (2009).
34
Id. at 3–4.
35
See Jones, supra note 21, at 1; see also THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND THE GATT: AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED
REMEDY FOR UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1987); Garrett E. Lynam, Using WTO
Countervailing Duty Law to Combat Illegally Subsidized Chinese Enterprises Operating in a
Nonmarket-Economy: Deciphering the Writing on the Wall, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 739, 742
(2010); Frank Vargo, NAM Welcomes Quick Fix to Offset China’s Subsidies, SHOPFLOOR.ORG
(March
1,
2012)
http://shopfloor.org/2012/03/nam-welcomes-quick-fix-to-offset-chinassubsidies/24178.
36
See generally Kara Loridas, United States-China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism in A
Globalized Economy?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 403, 414 (2011) (“China… complains of
being the victim of protectionist measures by developed countries, namely the United States.”);
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 1; McDaniel, supra note 1, at 742; Dan Ikenson, Congress Poised
to Escalate U.S.-China Trade War, FORBES (February 29, 2012), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2012/02/29/congress-poised-to-escalate-u-s-china-tradewar/.
37
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006). The International Trade Administration (ITA) is responsible for
designating countries as NME countries, and any determination that a foreign country is a NME
country remains in effect until specifically revoked by the ITA. JONES, TIPPTON & ROYLTON, supra
note 21, at 46–47. A NME country is defined as any foreign country that the administering authority
determines does not operate according to market principles. A NME designation is based on the
extent to which (1) the country’s currency is convertible; (2) its wage rates result from free
bargaining between labor and management; (3) joint ventures or other foreign investments are
permitted; (4) the government owns or controls the means of production; (5) the government
controls the allocation of resources and price and output decisions. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006). The
following countries are designated as NME countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Any determination that
a foreign country is a NME country remains in effect until revoked by the ITA. 19 U.S.C. § 1677
(2006).
38
ADA Art. 2.1. If there is not a sufficient volume of home market sales to calculate the normal
value, if home market sales by the exporter account for less than 5% of the quantity of the sales by
the exporter to the U.S. market, normal value is based on the price for which the product is sold in a
surrogate third country. Id. § 1677 (2006); Statement of Administrative Action on the Uruguay
Round, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994). If there is not a viable third country, normal value may be
based on constructed value, which is calculated by adding manufacturing costs of the merchandise in
the home market country, selling, general and administrative expenses and profits, and packaging
costs. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006).

143

SUMMER 2014

Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest

methodology, The DOC uses surrogate country40 factors of production to
calculate the normal value. It then compares normal value to the export
price to derive the dumping margin. 41 The factors of production used
include: (a) hours of labor required, (b) quantities of raw materials
employed, (c) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and (d)
representative capital cost, including depreciation. 42 The surrogate
country methodology that the DOC uses in NME AD cases 43 fully
incorporates the impact of a domestic subsidy provided by the foreign
government, assuming the subsidy affects export prices. This is because
the surrogate country value approximates the unsubsidized price of
goods in the NME domestic market, while the export price reflects the
impact of the domestic subsidy.
The assumption that a domestic subsidy is entirely passed on to
export prices is a major assumption, and one that is strongly disputed by
The DOC.44 The DOC maintains that the existence of a double remedy
depends on whether subsidies pass through, pro rata, to U.S. (export)
prices. An adjustment for duplicative remedies is only necessary for
countervailable subsidies, which are passed-through to lower export
prices. If a subsidy does not lower export prices it will not affect the
dumping margin, and therefore it will not give rise to a double counting
problem in concurrent AD and CVD investigations.
Economic theory suggests that any domestic subsidies that impact
marginal cost could be passed on to export prices.45 Any subsidy that
varies with the amount of units produced will affect marginal cost. 46
Similarly, subsidies that make production more efficient, such as a grant
to build a new plant or facility that is more efficient than the old facility,
would reduce marginal cost. 47 Assuming that at least some degree of
subsidies lower marginal costs and export prices, when The DOC
conducts concurrent AD and CVD investigations and accounts for
domestic subsidies they are essentially double counting the effect of such



39
The price at which a product is sold in the U.S. is called the export price (EP) if the first sale
in the U.S. is to a non-affiliated entity. Id. § 1677. If the first sale in the U.S. is to an entity that is
affiliated with the exporter, a constructed export price (CEP) is used where the CEP is the price of
the first sale to a non-affiliated entity in the U.S. Id. § 1677.
40
See id. § 1677. The surrogate country must be a market economy country that is at a
comparable level of economic development to the NME country and a significant producer of
comparable merchandise. Id. § 1677.
41
See id. § 1677. If the normal value cannot be determined based on a valuation of the factors
of production in a surrogate country, the DOC can use the market price of merchandise comparable
to the subject merchandise in the surrogate country. See id. § 1677.
42
Id. § 1677.
43
There is no double remedy problem for domestic subsidies in ME AD cases, because the
foreign producer's or exporter's own prices, however they may be affected by such subsidies, are
used to calculate the AD margins. See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n.9.
44
Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, ¶ 14.51, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter AD/CVD Panel Report];
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
45
See Diamond, supra note 26, at 538–539.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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subsidies.48
Unlike the AD laws that specifically include a methodology for
investigations of imports from NME countries 49 through their various
iterations, 50 the CVD laws have never referenced investigations of
imports from NME countries. 51 Prior to 2007, the U.S. did not apply
CVDs to NME countries as a matter of policy.52 In a 1984 determination
resulting from two investigations of steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia
and Poland, the ITA determined that there is no adequate way to
disaggregate government actions in centrally controlled economies.
Therefore, the ITA has no way to measure subsidies or the market
distortions caused by subsidies.53 The Court of International Trade (CIT)
reversed the ITA’s decision and held that CVD law can be applied to
NME countries. 54 However, the CIT decision was subsequently
overturned in Georgetown Steel where the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled that The DOC’s original position taken
from the ITA was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.55
In 2007, the ITA reversed its position on the application of CVDs to
NME countries in a CVD investigation that dealt with paper imported
from China. 56 In its preliminary investigation, the ITA concluded that



48
See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-474, U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 28
(2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05474.pdf; see also
Brian D. Kelly, The Offsetting Duty Norm and the Simultaneous Application of Countervailing and
Antidumping Duties, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 17 (Sept. 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653631.
49
See 19 U.S.C..§ 1677 (2006).
50
See Philip D. O'Neill Jr, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped and
Revisited – Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. L. REV. 832, 833-837 (1976), available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol17/iss5/4; Kevin C. Kennedy, An Examination Of
Domestic Subsidies And The Standard For Imposing Countervailing Duties, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1986); Julie Dunne, Delverde and the WTO's British Steel Decision
Foreshadow More Conflict Where the WTO Subsidies Agreement, Privatization, and United States
Countervailing Duty Law Intersect, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 86–87 (2001).
51
Vivian C. Jones, Trade Remedy Legislation: Applying Countervailing Action to Nonmarket
Economy Countries, in TRADE REMEDIES 43, 43 (2008). As a result, the administering authorities
have no specific statutory factors to consider or methodologies to use when identifying subsidies in
NME countries. Id. at 63. See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (“Congressional silence regarding
the application of the CVD law to NME countries may indicate that Congress never anticipated that
the CVD law would be applied while a country remained designated as an NME country.”).
52
See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Dukgeun Ahn & Jieun Lee, Countervailing Duty against
China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in the WTO System? 4 (GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
POLICY, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 615,
2011), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers601-625/r615.pdf.
53
In Carbon steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia and Carbon steel wire rod from Poland, the
ITA concluded that a “bounty or grant” within the meaning of the CVD law cannot be found in a
NME country. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (May 7, 1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland: Final
Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (May 7, 1984).
54
Cont’l Steel Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 340, 342 (1985). The CIT held that the ITA had
misinterpreted the CVD law by concluding it did not apply to NME countries. The court noted an
absence of clear legislative intent, and emphasized the plain language of the statute that applies to
any country, regardless of political or economic status. Id. at 347–50.
55
Georgetown Steel Corp. et al. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
56
See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia, et al., Office of Policy, Import Administration, to
David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on Whether the Analytical Elements
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while China should still be considered a NME country,57 its economy
was significantly different from the Soviet-style economies analyzed in
Georgetown Steel where central planners dictated prices, investment
decisions, credit availability, wage rates, and also restricted foreign
currency and private ownership of property. 58 As a result, the ITA
concluded that the current state of the Chinese economy was sufficiently
market-like to permit the agency to determine whether the Chinese
government had bestowed a benefit on a Chinese producer and whether
such a benefit was a specific countervailable subsidy.59 The ITA justified
this policy change in part because of China’s accession to the WTO and
the numerous economic reforms undertaken by China pursuant to its
accession. 60 As a result of the ITA’s decision, numerous CVD
investigations on products exported from China have been initiated since
2007.61 This phenomenon has precipitated vociferous accusations from
the Chinese government that the DOC is imposing duplicative remedies
by simultaneously treating China as a ME country for CVD purposes and
as a NME country for AD purposes.62
III. DOUBLE COUNTING IN U.S. COURTS: GPX INT’L TIRE CORP. V.
UNITED STATES
The issue of duplicative remedies in concurrent AD and CVD
investigations first arose in U.S. courts in 2009 with GPX International
Tire Corp. v. United States.63 The case followed an investigation of new
pneumatic off-the-road tires imported from China.64 The DOC initiated
the investigation in 2007 after several U.S. tire manufacturers and a trade
association filed petitions seeking the imposition of ADs and CVDs on


of the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China's Present–Day Economy 10 (Dep’t of
Commerce Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Georgetown Steel Memorandum], available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfsgeorgetown-applicability.pdf.
57
The DOC determined that China should be considered a NME country in Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, Greige Polyester Cotton Print Cloth from China.
48 Fed. Reg. 9897 (March 9, 1983).
58
Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 56 at 10. According to the DOC, the
Government of China acknowledges that the changing nature of its economy justifies the application
of CVD remedies even though China is still considered a NME country. See Protocol of Accession
of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (November 23, 2001), at section 15(b), available at
http://www.wto.org; see also Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic
of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,360 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (prelim. affirm. determination).
59
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,645 (Dep’t of
Commerce October 25, 2007) (final affirm. determination) and the accompanying Issues and
Decision Memorandum, at 10.
60
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 71,360, 71,363; see, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (October 1, 2001), at ¶ 4, available at http://www.wto.org.
61
See Lauren W. Clarke supra note 1, at 823 n.10 (2011).
62
Because the only two NME countries currently recognized by the ITA that have significant
volumes of trade with the U.S. are China and Vietnam, the scope of this issue is primarily limited to
exports from those two countries. See Jones, supra note 51, at 63.
63
645 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.64
Id.
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tire export companies. 65 The DOC pursued concurrent AD and CVD
investigations.66 It selected, as mandatory respondents,67 the three largest
Chinese producers and exporters of OTR tires: Guizhou Tire Co., Ltd.
(Guizhou), Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd. (Starbright), and Tianjin
United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd. (TUTRIC). 68 The ITC
made an affirmative material injury determination in both the AD and
CVD investigations. 69 In the CVD investigation, the DOC determined
that several of the alleged subsidies were countervailable, including: the
receipt of certain loans from Chinese banks;70 government provision of
rubber inputs; government forgiveness of debt; government provision of
land for less than adequate remuneration; and certain tax subsidies.71 The
Department also made a positive determination of sales at less than fair



65
See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. 71,360 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007).
66
See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. 44,122 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 7, 2007); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the
People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,591 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 6, 2007).
67
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(e) stipulates that the DOC calculate an individual countervailing subsidy
rate for each exporter or producer investigated. The subsidy rate is found by dividing the weightedaverage net amount of the subsidy conferred on a particular company by the company’s total sales in
the case of domestic subsidies or the firm’s total exports in the case of export subsidies. However, if
a large number of exporters or producers are involved, the DOC is permitted to select a limited
number of mandatory respondents and calculate individual rates for these exporters/producers and
apply an estimated rate for all exporters/producers not individually investigated. 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(2006); see also THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDERS
AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS 2–9 (U.S. International Trade Commission ed., 1995).
68
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed.
Reg. 51,624, 51,625 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 4, 2008) (amend. final affirm. determination of sales
at LTFV and AD order); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of
China, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,483 (Dep't Commerce July 15, 2008) (final affirm. CVD
determination and final neg. determination of critical circumstances). GPX International Tire
Corporation is a U.S. importer of off-the-road tires and wholly owns Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd.
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
69
See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed.
Reg. 51,842 (ITC Sept. 5, 2008) (affirm. injury determination).
70
The loans, some of which were issued by state-owned commercial banks, were allegedly
granted on a preferential, non-commercial basis. To calculate the benefit of the subsidy provided by
the loans, the DOC compared the amount paid for the loans by the recipients with a benchmark
interest rate calculated using a regression-based methodology based on the inflation-adjusted interest
rates of countries with similar per-capita gross national incomes as China. Certain New Pneumatic
Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,360, 71,367 (Dep’t of
Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (prelim. affirm. CVD determination). In most CVD investigations, the
DOC uses comparable commercial loans reported by the respondents as a benchmark to measure the
benefit, if any, conferred by the loan in question. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.505 (2012). However, in this
case the only loans reported by the respondents were provided by state-owned commercial banks as
part of the Government Policy Lending program. Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from
the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,364. Because the DOC does not treat loans as
commercial if they are received from a government bank as part of a government program, it
determined in this case that it was appropriate to use a national interest rate for comparable
commercial loans. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.505 (2012). However, the DOC does not consider the
Chinese national interest rate to be reliable as a benchmark because of the pervasiveness of
government intervention in the Chinese banking sector. Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,364–65; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.505.
71
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 71,364 (prelim. affirm. CVD determination) and accompanying Issues & Decisions
Memorandum 9–23.

147

SUMMER 2014

Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest

value in the AD investigation. 72 The AD margins applied to the
mandatory respondents were: 29.93% for Starbright, 8.44% for TUTRIC,
and 5.25% for Guizhou. 73 The CVD margins applied were: 14% for
Starbright, 6.85% for TUTRIC, and 2.45% for Guizhou. 74 GPX
International Tire Corporation, Ltd. (GPX), the parent company of
Starbright, challenged the final results of the AD and CVD investigations
in the CIT.75
A. CIT Decision in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States
In the CIT, GPX alleged that the application of both CVDs and ADs
using the NME AD methodology resulted in double counting of duties
and punished the Chinese companies twice for the same allegedly
“unfair” trading practice.76 The alleged double counting resulted from the
DOC applying CVDs to offset domestic subsidies and then comparing a
subsidy-free constructed normal value (calculated by using either
surrogate country prices or factors of production) with the original
subsidized export price to calculate the dumping margin.77 GPX argued
that domestic subsidies in the NME context should be given the identical
treatment as export subsidies in the ME context when the DOC is
conducting concurrent CVD and AD investigations using the NME AD
methodology. 78 The CIT held that while the DOC can apply CVD to
NME countries, 79 if it does so in conjunction with the NME AD
methodology the DOC has to apply methodologies that make the parallel
remedies reasonable and double counting unlikely to occur.80 The CIT



72
The DOC assigned separate rates to the twenty-three entities that demonstrated eligibility for
separate-rate status and a PRC-wide rate to all other exporters of the subject merchandise. See
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg.
40,485, 40,487–88, (Dep’t of Commerce July 15, 2008) (final affirm. determination of sales at
LTFV and partial affirm. determination of critical circumstances). In determining the PRC-wide rate,
the DOC applied facts available and used adverse inferences in choosing among the available facts
because the ‘PRC-wide entity’ failed to respond to a request for information. Id. at 40,488. The
DOC defined the ‘PRC-wide entity’ as all exporters other than those that qualified for separate rate
status. Id. The DOC determined that the ‘PRC-wide entity’ failed to respond because there were
actually more exporters of off-the-road tires from the PRC than the number of PRC exporters that
responded to the Quantity & Value Questionnaire and full antidumping questionnaire. Id. As a result
of the application of adverse facts available (AFA), while the separate rate weighted average
dumping margins applied ranged from 0-29.93%, the PRC-wide rate applied was 210%. Certain
New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,624–01,
51,626, (Dep’t of Commerce September 4, 2008) (notice of amend. final affirm. determination of
sales at LTFV and AD order).
73
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1240.
77
Id. at 1241.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1240.
80
Id. at 1243. Due to the difficulty of calculating the exact effect of subsidies on prices, the
court held that it was unreasonable for the DOC to place the burden of proof of showing double
counting on the respondent during the investigation. Id.
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reasoned that because the CVD statute is ambiguous, 81 and therefore
susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations, 82 and the DOC has
broad discretion in determining the existence of a subsidy under the
CVD law.83 Hence, it was reasonable for the DOC to apply the CVD
statute to a NME country. 84 However, given the high likelihood of
double counting 85 and the fact that the DOC can reasonably remedy
domestic subsidies using only the NME AD methodology, 86 the CIT
concluded that it was not reasonable for the DOC to apply CVDs without
adjusting for duplicative remedies.87 Significantly, the court did not say
that the DOC must make an automatic adjustment in any instance of
concurrent ADs and CVDs, but instead stated that the DOC must only
make an attempt to determine if double counting is occurring and then
remedy it if necessary.88
B. CAFC decision in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States
The United States government appealed the CIT decision 89 to the
CAFC.90 The CAFC reversed the CIT decision and held that The DOC


81

See id. at 1238–39.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
83
See Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
84
GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
85
See id. at 1242–43; see, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 28.
86
GPX (2009), 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 715 F.Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010)
(vacated by GPX Intern. Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). In the initial CIT
decision in GPX (2010), the court remanded the case to the DOC to either not apply CVD or to
attempt to eliminate duplicative remedies. See id. at 1343. The DOC decided to continue applying
CVD but offset the amount of CVDs against the calculated AD deposit rates. See id. The CIT held
that this methodology was not reasonable because the language of the then-existing CVD statute did
not permit such an offset and because of “the expense associated with conducting an additional
investigation that is essentially useless.” See id. at 1345. The DOC had considered three alternatives
to avoid double counting: not applying CVDs; treating the respondents as market-oriented
enterprises (MOEs); or offsetting the CVDs against the NME ADs after using its regular
methodologies to calculate the CVDs and NME AD margins. Final Results of Redetermination
Pursuant to Remand 8 (Dep't Commerce Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Remand Results]. The DOC
chose the offsetting methodology as the ‘least objectionable,’ Remand Results at 8, implementing it
by offsetting a respondent’s calculated export subsidy rate against its calculated AD margin for
purposes of determining the AD cash deposit rates. Remand Results at 12 n.3; see also Dupont
Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court noted that
with this offset methodology, the combination of the CVD margin and the NME AD cash deposit
rate will always equal the unaltered NME AD margin, rendering concurrent CVD and AD
investigations unnecessary, “because the same remedial price adjustment can otherwise be obtained
by merely conducting an NME AD investigation.” See GPX, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. Given the
time and expense of a CVD investigation, the court held it was not reasonable to “force[ ] foreign
parties to spend many months and large sums of money to go through an investigation, the end result
of which is to calculate a CVD margin, but then to eliminate that CVD [margin] because it has been
offset by some parallel investigation.” See id. The government and U.S. manufacturers favoring the
imposition of CVD remedies appealed this decision to the CAFC. GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United
States, 666 F.3d 732, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
90
GPX, 666 F.3d at 732. The CAFC reheard the case following the passage of the statute. See
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
82
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may not apply the CVD statute to NME countries.91 The CAFC based its
decision on the theory of legislative ratification established in a previous
CAFC case, Georgetown Steel.92 In Georgetown Steel, the CAFC held
that it was reasonable for The DOC to conclude that CVD law does not
apply to NME countries because economic incentives and benefits
provided by a centrally planned government cannot be considered a
“bounty” or “grant” under the meaning of the CVD statute.93
Subsequently, Congress amended and reenacted the CVD statute in
1988 and 1994 without incorporating language applying it to NME
countries,94 thereby demonstrating both that it was aware of the judicial
interpretation and accepted it by reenacting the statute without change.95
In response to the CAFC’s decision in GPX96 Congress passed a statute
in 2012 specifically authorizing the application of CVDs to NME
countries.97
IV. DOUBLE COUNTING AT THE WTO: UNITED STATES – DEFINITIVE
ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON CERTAIN
PRODUCTS FROM CHINA (US-AD/CVD)
The issue of duplicative remedies, as applied in concurrent AD and
CVD investigations, has been litigated at the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) of the WTO. In 2008, in response to the increasing number of
concurrent AD and CVD investigations, China requested consultations
with the United States through the DSB. 98 Despite the fact that the
consultations proved unsuccessful and the United States blocked China’s
first request for a panel, 99 a panel was eventually convened in 2009
following China’s second request.100 Among other issues, China alleged
that the concurrent U.S. countervailing and antidumping duty measures


91

GPX, 666 F.3d at 739.
Id.
93
Georgetown Steel Corp. et al. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
94
In 1988 Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107. Legislative history of
the act indicated that Congress intentionally rejected a prior version of the House bill that included a
provision applying CVD law to NME countries. See §§ 1311–1337. In 1994 Congress passed the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), which changed the
‘bounty’ or ‘grant’ terminology to ‘subsidy,’ but did not substantively alter the meaning of the term.
See STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ON THE URUGUAY ROUND, H.R. Doc. No. 103–316,
at 925 (1994).
95
See GPX, 666 F.3d at 739–40, 745.
96
Id. at 745.
97
See infra Section V for further discussion; See Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions
To Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012).
98
Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter AD/CVD Panel Report].
99
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) (adopted Mar. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm.
100
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 1.1-1.3.
92
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imposed on four Chinese products101 were inconsistent with Articles VI:3
and I:1 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 10, 12.1, 12.8, 19.3, 19.4 and
32.1 of the SCM Agreement.102
V. Panel Ruling in US-AD/CVD
China argued that because of the surrogate, market-determined NME
AD methodology, simultaneous application of U.S. CVD law resulted in
domestic subsidy being offset twice. 103 China noted the longstanding
U.S. policy of not applying CVD to NME countries104 and that the DOC
recognizes that its methodology of calculating ADs can offset domestic
subsidies in the ME context.105 The United States strongly disputed that
the DOC’s NME AD methodology precisely offsets subsidization.106 The
United States claimed it was not clear that subsidies reduced the cost of
production on a pro rata basis, and therefore would be fully accounted
for in a dumping margin.107 Nor that the substitution of actual, subsidized
values of factors of production with surrogate, unsubsidized values
inflates the normal value in an amount equal to the subsidy. 108 The
United States also claimed that the covered agreements did not prohibit
the imposition of double remedies in the case of domestic subsidies.109
The Panel ruled in favor of the United States with respect to every
major issue raised, dismissing China’s “as-applied” claims 110 under
Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3
of the GATT 1994.111 While the Panel reaffirmed the basic precept that
concurrent use of AD and CVD laws may result in double remedies,112 it
concurred with the United State’s assertion that the existence of double
remedies in any given case depends on the facts, specifically whether the
subsidy in question results in the reduction of the export price.113 The
Panel then determined that none of the provisions of the SCM
Agreement or the GATT 1994 cited by China 114 prohibited the



101
The four products covered in the investigations were: (i) Circular Welded Carbon Quality
Steel Pipe; (ii) Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires; (iii) Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and
Tube; and (iv) Laminated Woven Sacks. AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 2.2.
102
Id. ¶ 14.44.
103
Id. ¶ 14.47.
104
Id. ¶ 14.48.
105
Id. ¶ 14.49.
106
See id. ¶¶ 14.54-14.59.
107
Id. ¶ 14.55.
108
Id.
109
Id. ¶ 14.86.
110
The Panel found that the ‘as such’ claims made by China with respect to SCM Articles 10,
19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 and Articles I:1 and VI of the GATT 1994 were outside its terms of reference
because China had failed to include them in its request for consultations. Id. ¶¶ 14.11, 14.12, 14.36.
111
See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 45 INT'L LAW, 79 (2011).
112
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 14.70-14.72.
113
Id. ¶ 14.71.
114
The Panel declined to take account of the CIT decision, GPX (2009), which concluded that
U.S. law required the DOC to avoid offsetting the same subsidies twice when it uses its NME
methodology in countervailing duty and antidumping investigations. See Bentes, supra note 112
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imposition of both ADs and CVDs with respect to domestic subsidies.115
The Panel relied heavily on the fact that the SCM provisions116 cited
by China did not reference concurrent remedies or antidumping duties,
and therefore concluded that the provisions should be read narrowly to
only impose limitations on the application of countervailing duties. 117
The Panel focused particularly on Article 19.4, which prohibits
countervailing duties in excess of the amount of existing subsidy.118 The
Panel looked to the ordinary meaning of the text119 and concluded that
the terms of the provision referred only to the amount of existing subsidy
in a countervailing duty investigation. 120 The Panel reasoned that the
concurrent application of ADs and CVDs by the Department did not
violate Article 19.4 because China failed to demonstrate that the
application of NME AD duties affected the amount of existing subsidy in
CVD investigations. 121 Similarly, when the Panel considered Article
19.3, which requires that subsidies be levied “in the appropriate
amounts,”122 it interpreted the provision to mean that the DOC imposes
countervailing duties in the appropriate amounts if the duties do not
exceed the amount of existing subsidy. 123 Thus, China failed to prove
that the DOC violated the SCM provisions governing those issues 124
because China did not demonstrate that the imposition of NME ADs, in
the context of a concurrent CVD investigation, affects the existence of a
subsidy, the amount of existing subsidy, or the appropriate amounts of
countervailing duties.125
Additionally, the Panel took a contextual approach to interpreting the
relevant agreements, noting that AD and CVD are regulated under two



115
See AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 14.112, 14.115, 14.117, 14.130, 14.136,
14.138.
116
The only provision cited by China that does reference concurrent AD and CVD remedies is
GATT Article VI:5, which the Panel interpreted narrowly to apply only to concurrent remedies in
cases involving export subsidies, not domestic subsidies. See id. ¶ 14.117.
117
See id. ¶ 14.112.
118
The text of Article 19.4 reads: “No countervailing duty shall be levied on any imported
product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization
per unit of the subsidized and exported product.” SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.4; see
also Dukgeun Ahn, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 761, 765 (2011). Appellate Body Report, supra note 100.
119
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 98, ¶ 14.108.
120
Id. ¶ 14.112.
121
Id. ¶ 14.139.
122
Article 19.3 reads: “When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory
basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury.” SCM
Agreement, supra note 3.
123
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.128.
124
Id. ¶ 14.139. The Panel also found that Articles 12.1 and 12.8 of the SCM Agreement, which
require a state agency conducting a CVD investigation to give notice to interested WTO Member
states, did not require the DOC to adopt criteria to assess the occurrence of double remedies or to
disclose what evidence would be necessary to establish the existence of a double remedy. Id. ¶¶
14.147, 14.148.
125
Id. ¶ 14.138.
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separate and distinct agreements126 as well as two separate and distinct
paragraphs of Article VI of the GATT 1994. 127 The provision that
references the application of ADs and CVDs, GATT Article VI:5, only
applies to export subsidies,128 which the Panel interpreted as inapplicable
to domestic subsidies.129 The Panel also found it significant that a prior
agreement on subsidies and CVD, the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code,
explicitly provided for the concurrent application of ADs and CVDs to
NME countries. 130 The Panel interpreted the prior existence and
termination of this provision to mean the drafters of the SCM Agreement
were aware of the issue and chose not to address it in Article 19.4.131 The
Panel also rejected China's claims under Article I:1. In its view China
failed to establish that the DOC “maintains a consistent ‘policy’ or
‘practice’ of taking all necessary steps to avoid the imposition of double
remedies,”132 in investigations of ME countries, and therefore the U.S.
does not confer an advantage on ME countries with respect to NME
countries.133
VI. Appellate Body Ruling in US-AD/CVD
China appealed to the Appellate Body, 134 which substantially
reversed the Panel findings.135 The Appellate Body focused on Article
19.3 of the SCM Agreement,136 which requires that subsidies be levied
“in the appropriate amount.”137
While the Panel interpreted Article 19.3 in light of Article 19.4 to
mean that the amount of subsidies levied must not exceed the amount of
subsidies found to exist, 138 the Appellate Body determined that this
approach would be too restrictive and would render 19.3 redundant.139
Instead the Appellate Body looked to other provisions of the SCM
Agreement. It noted the causal link made between the injury suffered and



126
These are the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Antidumping
Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, respectively.
127
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.116.
128
Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 ("No product of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.”).
129
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.117.
130
Id. ¶ 14.119.
131
Id.
132
Id. ¶ 14.181.
133
See id. ¶¶ 14.168, 14.182.
134
Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (March 11, 2011) [hereinafter AD/CVD AB
Report] available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-adcvdchina(ab).pdf.
135
See Bentes, supra note 112.
136
AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 547–58.
137
SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.3.
138
AD/CVD Panel Report, supra note 99, ¶ 14.128, AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, at ¶
547.
139
AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 555–56.

153

SUMMER 2014

Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest

the amount of subsidies levied in Article 19.2,140 as well as the GATT
1994, and determined that the SCM Agreement and the Antidumping
Agreement must be read together in context. 141 The Appellate Body
concluded that it would effectively circumvent the rules of both
agreements to permit “the levying of a total amount of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties which, if added together, would not be appropriate
and would exceed the combined amounts of dumping and subsidization
found.”142
The Appellate Body also rejected the Panel’s reliance on both the
exclusion argument that GATT Article VI:5 references only export
subsidies and therefore excludes domestic subsidies.143 Additionally, the
Panel disregarded the omission argument that the concurrent AD-CVD
provision in the prior Tokyo Round Subsidies Code was not included in
the SCM Agreement.144
After concluding that Article 19.3 prohibits double counting,145 the
Appellate Body determined that the investigating authority, the U.S., has
an obligation to investigate and establish that subsidies are not being
offset twice by concurrent ADs and CVDs. 146 However, the Appellate
Body did not say that the investigating authority must make an
adjustment in any instance of concurrent ADs and CVDs, only that the
investigating authority must conduct an investigation to ascertain if an
adjustment is necessary.147 In this instance, the DOC failed to investigate
whether double remedies arose from the concurrent NME AD and CVD
investigations.148 Therefore, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. had
violated its obligations under Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement.149
VII. P.L. 112-99: CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO GPX INTERNATIONAL
TIRES AND US-AD/CVD
In response to both the CAFC decision in GPX International Tires
and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD,150 the U.S. Congress



140
SCM Agreement, supra note 3, at Article 19.2 (“The decision whether or not to impose a
countervailing duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the
decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed shall be the full amount of the
subsidy or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable
that . . . the duty should be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty would be
adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.”).
141
AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 135, ¶¶ 571–72.
142
Id. at ¶ 572.
143
Id. at ¶ 580.
144
Id. at ¶ 581.
145
Id. at ¶ 590.
146
Id. at ¶ 602.
147
Id.
148
Id. at ¶¶ 603–05.
149
Id. at ¶ 606.
150
See Alan Beattie, US Congress plans to override court on tariffs, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 29,
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9be8c946-62f8-11e1-b837-00144feabdc0.html; Dan Ikenson,
Congress Poised to Escalate U.S.-China Trade War, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2012/02/29/congress-poised-to-escalate-u-s-china-tradewar/.
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passed Public Law 112-99, “Application of Countervailing Duty
Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries.”151 The statute amended §
701 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 152 It added a general provision 153 that
stipulated that countervailing duties will apply to merchandise imported
from a NME country.154
P.L. 112-99 also amended § 777A of the Tariff Act of 1930155 to
allow the DOC to adjust AD duties in cases involving concurrent
application of CVD. 156 The DOC can make these adjustments when a
subsidy has reduced the average export price of the subject merchandise
and the DOC can reasonably estimate the extent that a countervailable
subsidy increased the weighted average dumping margin of the subject
merchandise.157
There are two forums in which this statute, or the DOC’s
implementation of it, can be challenged. A respondent in a concurrent
AD/CVD investigation, to whom the DOC applies § 1677(f)(1), can
challenge the DOC’s final determination in U.S. court by bringing a
claim to the Court of International Trade.158 Alternatively, China, or any



151
The CAFC ruled on GPX Tires in December 2011; Public Law 112-99 was passed in early
March 2012. See Beattie, supra note 150; Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions To
Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 1(b), 126 Stat. 265 (2012). The legislative
history of the statute suggests it had bipartisan support and legislators believed the statute was
necessary to protect U.S. manufacturers from China’s unfair trade practices. See 158 CONG. REC.
H1165-02 (daily ed. March 6, 2012); see also Frank Vargo, NAM Welcomes Quick Fix to Offset
China’s Subsidies, SHOPFLOOR.ORG (March 1, 2012), http://shopfloor.org/2012/03/nam-welcomesquick-fix-to-offset-chinas-subsidies/24178.
152
19 U.S.C. § 1671.
153
See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(1) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2), the merchandise on which
countervailing duties shall be imposed under subsection (a) includes a class or kind of merchandise
imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket
economy country.”). The statute also includes a retroactive provision making it applicable to all
proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006. See Application of Countervailing Duty
Provisions To Nonmarket Economy Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 1(b), 126 Stat. 265, supra, note
151.
154
The amended language also introduces an exception in cases where the DOC is unable to
determine the amount of the subsidy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(2) (2006) (“A countervailing duty is
not required to be imposed under subsection (a) on a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold
(or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy country if
the administering authority is unable to identify and measure subsidies provided by the government
of the nonmarket economy country or a public entity within the territory of the nonmarket economy
country because the economy of that country is essentially comprised of a single entity.”).
155
19 U.S.C. § 1677(f)(1).
156
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1) (2006). This provision was made effective from the date the statute
went into effect. See Pub. L. No. 112-99, § 2(b).126 Stat. 265 (2012), supra, note 151.
157
Id.
158
The NME CVD statute has already been challenged as unconstitutional. See Pl.’s Rule 56.2
Mot. for J. on the Agency R. at 2, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug.
17, 2012) (No. 366) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief – GPX]; Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency
R. at 2, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 17, 2012) (No. 367)
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief – Tianjin]. The plaintiffs in GPX, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. and Tianjin,
filed CIT Rule 56.2 motions for judgment on the agency record to challenge its final AD and CVD
determinations in Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China.
See Pl.’s Br. – GPX, at 2; Pl.’s Br. – Tianjin, at 2. The United States and Titan Tire Corp. had
petitioned the CAFC to rehear its December 19, 2011 decision, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 666
F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011). GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Following the enactment of P.L. 112-19, the CAFC requested briefing on the new legislation and its
impact on the proceedings. Id. at 1311. The CAFC then remanded the proceedings to the CIT for
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other NME country to which the DOC applies § 1677(f)(1), can make a
request for consultations at the DSB of the WTO.159
A. Consistency of P.L. 112-99 Under U.S. Law
1. Text of P.L. 112-99
Public Law 112-99 is facially consistent with U.S. law. Proponents
of the House bill (H.R. 4105) in the Ways and Means Committee went to
great lengths to demonstrate that the language of the bill would overturn
the CAFC decision in GPX and that it would be consistent with U.S.
obligations under the WTO.160 Section 1(a), which provides a statutory
basis for the application of CVD to NME countries, addresses the
concerns of the CAFC in GPX and is also consistent with U.S. law.161
With respect to the CAFC decision in GPX, which held that there was no
statutory basis for the DOC to apply CVD to NME countries, the
statutory language explicitly authorizes the imposition of CVD in
investigations of exports from NME countries.162
Section 2(a) addresses the concerns of the lower court in GPX.163
Specifically, the CIT held that the DOC must, when it chooses to adjust,
make a reasonable effort to adjust for duplicative remedies in concurrent


consideration of the constitutional issues raised. Id. at 1313. GPX. Tianjin also alleged that P.L. 11299 is unconstitutional because the retroactive provision of Section 1(b) violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution and the discrepancy in effective dates between Section 1 and Section 2
violates the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the 5th Amendment. See Pl.’s Br. –
GPX, at 2, Pl.’s Br. – Tianjin, at 3. The CIT rejected both of these arguments. The CIT held that the
Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to P.L. 112-99 because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to
retroactive penal legislation, and trade remedies laws are remedial, not punitive in nature. GPX Int’l
Tire Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-00285, Slip Op. 13-2, at 16, 18 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 7, 2013). The CIT
also held that the law is consistent with due process and equal protection. It found that the
retrospective nature of the law does not violate due process because customs duties and trade
remedies are a uniquely retrospective assessment scheme, That means the plaintiffs could not have
reasonably relied on any predicted duty rate prior to the enactment of the law. Id. at 23–25. The
Court also upheld the law as consistent with equal protection because the law is rationally related to
legitimate state interests, namely maintaining administrative efficiency and the finality of the 24
investigations affected by the retroactivity provision. Id. at 30–31.
159
China has already requested consultations with the United States and challenged the
consistency of P.L. 112-99 with the WTO Agreements, specifically Articles X:1, X:2, and X:3 of the
GATT 1994 as well as Articles 10, 15, 19, 21, and 32 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the
GATT 1994. Request for Consultations, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, at 3–4, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012).
161
Id.
160
See 158 CONG. REC. H1166-06 (daily ed. March 6, 2012); Summary of “A Bill to Apply the
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and For
Other
Purposes,”
House
Committee
on
Ways
and
Means,
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_cvd_one_pager.pdf; Press Release, Michelle
Dimarob, Press Sect., House Ways and Means Committee, Camp, Levin, Brady, and McDermott
Introduce Legislation to Ensure Commerce Department Can Continue to Apply Countervailing Duty
Laws to Non-Market Economies Like China (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=282425.
161
See GPX, 666 F.3d 732, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
162
See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(f)(1) (2006).
163
Id. (Section 2(a) amends Title VII, § 777A of the Tariff Act of 1930 by adding §777A(f),
enacted as 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)). All further citations will be to the United States Code.
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AD/CVD investigations.164 The court also explained that the burden of
calculating such duplication rests with the DOC.165 The statute states that
the DOC is to determine whether a countervailable subsidy reduced the
average price of imports and thereby increased the dumping margin.166
The statute further instructs the DOC to make adjustments as necessary,
provided that it can reasonably estimate the extent to which the subsidy
increased the dumping margin.167
On its face, the statute adequately addresses the issue of double
counting. It does so by requiring the DOC to avoid duplicative remedies
by adjusting the dumping margin in investigations where a
countervailable subsidy is passed through to lower export prices. To date,
the methodology the DOC has used to implement Section 2(a) 168 is
somewhat problematic. However, given the deference accorded federal
agencies in implementing their authorizing statutes,169 the methodology
meets the standard of “reasonable or in accordance with law.”
2. Offsetting Methodology of P.L. 112-99
The DOC’s methodology for avoiding duplicative remedies in
concurrent AD and CVD meets the standard of “reasonable and in
accordance with law.” 170 Section 2(a) of P.L. 112-99, codified as 19
U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1), requires that a subsidy be offset if the DOC finds
the subsidy reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of
merchandise 171 and if the DOC can reasonably estimate the extent to
which the subsidy increased the weighted average dumping margin for
the class or kind of merchandise.172 In GPX, the CIT assumed that all
domestic subsidies received would be passed-through to reduce the
export price. 173 However, the DOC asserts that the effect of domestic
subsidies on export price in a NME country is too uncertain to support
this precept. 174 The concurrent AD/CVD investigations the DOC has


164

See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009).
Id.
166
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1) (2006).
167
Id.
168
See Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, for the Final Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Drawn Stainless
Steel Sinks from the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 19, 2013) (Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter
Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks].
169
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
170
The standard of review in a case challenging a CVD determination is that the court “shall
hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2006).
171
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) (2006).
172
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C) (2006).
173
See GPX, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) (vacated by GPX Intern. Tire
Corp. v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2009).
174
See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1242; Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado,
165
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conducted thus far support the conclusion that respondents cannot
demonstrate that the domestic subsidies they receive are passed-through
pro rata to reduce export prices.
The DOC has conducted several concurrent AD/CVD investigations
since implementing P.L. 112-99.175 It has used a methodology that was
initially developed in the Section 129 reviews, which were conducted
after the US-AD/CVD decision to root out duplicative remedies. 176
Following the Appellate Body ruling in US-AD/CVD, the DOC
conducted Section 129 reviews of the four challenged AD/CVD
investigations to bring them into compliance with the Appellate Body
ruling.177
Section 129 reviews provide some insight 178 into the reasoning
behind the DOC’s current methodology for mandating the estimation of
duplicative remedies.179 However, the DOC was facing a strict deadline
when it conducted the Section 129 reviews and has since refined its
methodology in several significant ways.
a. Offsetting Methodology Used in Section 129 Reviews. As stated
earlier, the DOC conducted Section 129 determinations180 on four non-


Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, for the Final Determination in the Antidumping
Investigation of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules,
from the People's Republic of China, at 53í58 (Oct. 9, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce).
175
Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 168.
176
Issues and Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, for the Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Drawn
Stainless Steel Sinks from the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 27, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce),
available
at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2012-24549-1.pdf,
[hereinafter
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks]; Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel
Sinks, supra note 168, at 4.
177
See, e.g., Memorandum from Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, &
Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant
Secretary, Import Administration, on Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies”
Analysis Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379 (May 31, 2012) (Dep’t
of Commerce) [hereinafter Section 129 Determination – Laminated Woven Sacks].
178
The DOC qualified its determinations in the Section 129 investigations with the caveat that
they were conducted on a compressed timeline and noted that the agency’s administration of 19
U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) will likely evolve with time and experience. See Memorandum from Christopher
Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on Section 129
Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road
Tires from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to the WTO
Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379, at 7 (May 31, 2012) (Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires].
179
The DOC found that P.L. 112-99 applied, subject to subsection (c) of Section 129 of the
URAA, to “all determinations issued under subsection (b)(2) of that section on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act,” which included the Section 129 determinations. See, e.g., id. at 6.
180
Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA provides that notwithstanding any provision of the Act, upon
written request from the U.S. Trade Representative, the DOC will issue a determination that would
render its actions not inconsistent with an adverse finding of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body.
Such relief is prospective only. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, §
129(c)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
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compliant AD/CVD investigations.181 In each of these reviews, the DOC
used the same methodology to estimate the extent the subsidies lowered
the respective export price of the applicable goods. Rather than
requesting data from the individual mandatory respondents, the DOC
looked at industry-level data 182 and concluded that manufacturers in
China changed prices in response to increases in input costs over the
previous month.183
The DOC found that the increases in input costs were related to
changes in variable cost.184 Additionally, it determined that in the case of
input price subsidies, the only evidence that connected a subsidy with
lower export prices was the subsidy-variable cost link.185 However, the
DOC could only estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through for
subsidies that were likely to have impacted variable costs.186 Therefore,
the DOC excluded from its investigation all subsidies other than those
related to input production costs.187
This severely limited the scope of the DOC’s determinations. For
instance, in the Section 129 determination covering certain pneumatic
off-the-road tires, the DOC determined that it could only be
demonstrated that one type of subsidy reduced the average cost of
imports, per 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B), input subsidies.188 In the offthe-road tires CVD investigation, input subsidies only accounted for one
of the countervailable subsidies in the original investigation, namely the
government provision of rubber for less than adequate remuneration.189
The DOC thereby excluded all the other types of subsidies in the original
investigation from its pass-through estimation. The exclusions include:
government policy lending, government debt forgiveness, the provision
of land, stamp tax exemption on share transfers, tax subsidies and local



181
See Section 129 Determination – Laminated Woven Sacks, supra note 177; Memorandum
from Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the
Chief Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration,
on Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to
the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WT/DS 379 (May 31, 2012); Memorandum from
Christopher Mutz, Office of Policy, Import Administration, & Daniel Calhoun, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Import Administration, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on
Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular
Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China: “Double Remedies” Analysis Pursuant to the
WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WT/DS 379 (May 31, 2012); Section 129 Determination – OTR
Tires, supra note 177.
182
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 177, at 8.
183
Id. at 9.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See Certain New Pneumatic Off–the–Road Tires From the People's Republic of China, 73
Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,484 (July 15, 2008) (final affirm. CVD determination and final neg.
determination of critical circumstances).
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income tax exemption and reduction programs, VAT and tariff
exemptions, and the State Key Technology Renovation Project Fund.190
The DOC also estimated the extent its proxy for subsidies affected
export prices. To accomplish this estimation the DOC used the
following: the average ratio of rolling monthly, year-on-year changes in
production input costs; changes in an aggregate production input price
index as a proxy for input costs to monthly, year-on-year changes in exfactory prices; changes in an aggregate producer price index as a proxy
for ex-factory prices; and data for the manufacturing sector in China
available through Bloomberg’s electronic terminal database.191 This ratio
of price-cost changes “estimates the extent of price responsiveness
during the period of investigation to changes in variable cost for
producers in China.”192
Because the DOC relied on data from the entire manufacturing
sector, its estimate of the extent subsides impacted export prices was
identical in all four determinations and “approximately 63.07 percent of
the value of the subsidies that . . . impacted variable costs . . . were
‘passed through’ to export prices.” 193 In the off-the-road tires
investigation, this estimation resulted in an average reduction of the cash
deposit rate. 194 In other words a correction of approximately .08%
applied to the original AD.195 This low percentage is representative of the
results of the few investigations conducted to date. It demonstrates the
limited practical effect of requiring the DOC to investigate and make an
adjustment for duplicative remedies in concurrent AD/CVD
investigations. The DOC qualified its determinations in the Section 129
reviews, stating that the analysis was limited by a short timeline and that
the agency’s methodology might evolve over time.196
b. Offsetting the Methodology Used in Subsequent Investigations.
In the investigations conducted after the Section 129 reviews, the DOC
improved its methodology for implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f). It
did so while reiterating that its application of the law will continue to be
refined.197 In the investigations since the first four, the DOC changed its
approach by sending questionnaires to respondents to find which
countervailable subsidies reduced the respondents’ cost of manufacturing


190

See id.
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 9–10.
192
Id. at 10.
193
Id.
194
Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration, on
Final Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in
WT/DS 379 Regarding the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Certain New
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China, at 38–41 (July 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires].
195
Id.
196
See id. at 7.
197
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 21.
191
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(“COM”).198 In both the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks and the Hardwood
and Decorative Plywood investigations, the respondents indicated that
there were cost-to-price linkages for certain countervailable subsidies
that impact COM.199
After verifying the information submitted by the respondents, the
DOC determined that an adjustment was warranted for the identified
subsidies that demonstrated cost-to-price linkages that affect COM.200 In
the Hardwood and Decorative Plywood Investigation, the DOC declined
to make an adjustment. The DOC declined the adjustments after
determining that the respondents had not provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate cost-to-price linkages for the subsidies identified.201
Another potentially significant difference between the Section 129
reviews and the subsequent investigations is that in the former, the DOC
assumed that only input subsidies lower export prices. 202 This was due to
time constraints and a lack of responsiveness from the GOC.203 In the
subsequent investigations the DOC solicited information regarding any
subsidies that lower respondents’ COM,204 including subsidies other than
input subsidies.205
The second half of the adjustment methodology, in which the DOC
attempts to reasonably estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through to


198

Id. at 22.
Id.; Decision Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, for the Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Hardwood
and Decorative Plywood from the People’s Republic of China, at 32 (Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter
Preliminary Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood], available at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2013-10532-1.pdf.
200
Final Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 155, at 4.
201
Preliminary Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood, supra note 199, at 32.
202
According to the DOC, the record in the Section 129 reviews lacked any evidence that any
type of subsidy other than input subsidies affects variable cost. Id. at 22. The DOC also stated that
the GOC failed to provide evidence to support its claim that the pass-through effect was not just
limited to input subsidies. Id. In GPX (2009), the CIT held that it was unreasonable for the DOC to
place the burden of showing double remedies on the respondent due to the difficulty of measuring
the exact effect of a subsidy on price. 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242í43 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). If the
DOC conducted a concurrent AD/CVD investigation and placed the burden of proof of showing that
subsidies other than input subsidies affected variable cost, the court would likely find that the
resulting determination was unreasonable. The DOC relied on a Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia
(CLSA)-Market monthly China PMI report on Manufacturing, which found that Chinese
manufacturers changed output prices in response to increases in input costs over the previous month
and that only part of the cost increases were passed on to customers in the form of higher selling
prices. Id. at 22. As a result, the DOC determined that the only domestic subsidies that reduce import
prices, per 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(1)(B), are ones that affect variable cost, namely input subsidies, and
therefore the DOC excluded all other subsidies from its analysis. Section 129 Determination – OTR
Tires, supra note 165, at 9. The CLSA Report did not analyze the relationship between changes in
other types of costs and changes in output prices. See Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires,
supra note 179, at 22.
203
Id.
204
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22; Preliminary
Determination – Hardwood and Decorative Plywood, supra note 199, at 32.
205
However, the onus is on the respondent to identify which of the countervailable subsidies
reduce its COM, which could include a subsidy other than an input subsidy, and assuming the DOC
is able to verify the cost-to-price linkage identified by the respondent, could result in an adjustment
for a subsidy other than an input subsidy.
199
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export price, remains problematic due to the DOC’s reliance on
manufacturing sector data rather than firm-specific data. After
determining that a respondent has adequately demonstrated a cost-toprice linkage for a countervailable subsidy, the DOC must estimate the
extent of pass-through in order to make an adjustment to the applied
antidumping rate.206 In the Section 129 reviews, the DOC used data from
the Chinese manufacturing sector as a whole to estimate the extent of
pass-through.207 The DOC did this because it could then match price and
cost to the subject merchandise and pair cost and price series from the
same group at the sector level. 208 While the DOC acknowledged that
export prices and U.S. import prices of subject merchandise may be a
more appropriate price measure than manufacturing sector data,209 data
constraints prevented them from disaggregating U.S. import data in order
to match the price and cost series under a subset of the manufacturing
sector.210
Additionally, the DOC also used input price inflation to estimate
pass-through, which it acknowledged is an inexact proxy for the extent of
subsidy pass-through. 211 Similarly, in the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks
investigation, the DOC determined that the respondents failed to provide
sufficient information to calculate company-specific estimates to
determine the extent of subsidy pass-through. Consequently, the DOC
declined to utilize the information supplied by respondents regarding
cost-linked price changes. 212 Instead the DOC applied a ‘documented
ratio of cost-price changes for the Chinese manufacturing sector as a
whole” to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. 213 The
documented ratio used in the initial determination was approximately
61%,214 similar to the approximately 63% calculated in the Section 129
reviews.215
3. Reasonableness of Offsetting Methodology
The estimation methodology the DOC developed in the Section 129
determinations and refined in subsequent investigations are reasonable
implementations of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) because of three factors: the


206

19 § U.S.C. 1677f-1(f)(1)(C).
See Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 22. The DOC
compared the rate of change of an aggregate input index and of an aggregate price index to
determine how much of each CVD rate increased the AD cash deposit rate. Section 129
Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 9. The DOC relied on the record evidence to
estimate that 63.07% of the subsidies were passed through to export prices and to identify the
portion of each CVD rate estimated to have increased the AD cash deposit rate.
208
Id.
209
Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 29.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 26.
212
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 21í22.
213
Id. at 22.
214
Id.
215
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 10.
207
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deferential standard of review applied to the DOC’s implementing
methodologies; the burden of proof of showing duplicative remedies
allocated to the respondent; and the applicability of available adverse
facts.
a. Standard of Review. The standard of review in a case
challenging an AD or CVD determination is that the court, “shall hold
unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”216 The two-step framework provided in Chevron
governs judicial review of the DOC's interpretation and implementation
of the CVD statute.217 Under Chevron, the court first determines whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress governs. If Congress has
not spoken directly on the issue, the court must determine whether the
agency responsible for filling a gap in the statute has rendered an
interpretation that is based on a permissible construction of the statute.218
If the DOC’s interpretation is reasonable, albeit not the only or even
preferred reasonable interpretation, it will withstand judicial scrutiny.219
This standard reflects the legislative intent that the courts afford
considerable deference to the DOC administration 220 and
methodology.221
b. Burden of Proof. The deferential standard of review is most
relevant because 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) does not affirmatively
allocate the burden of proof of demonstrating duplicative remedies.
According to the DOC, the burden of proof is on the respondent because,
in a case where a respondent seeks an adjustment of an antidumping
duty, the burden of proof is on the respondent seeking the adjustment.222
The DOC considers a calculation to avoid duplicative remedies in a
concurrent AD-CVD investigation to be an ‘adjustment’ to an
antidumping duty. Consequently, the respondent alleging duplicative
duties has the burden to show that a subsidy reduced the average price of
imports.223
The statute does not state which party bears the burden of proof.


216

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
See Hiep Thanh Seafood Joint Stock Co. v. U.S., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (2012).
218
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 467 U.S. at 842í43 (1984).
219
See NSK Ltd. v. U.S., 115 F.3d 965, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
220
See U.S. Steel Group v. U.S., 225 F.3d 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
221
GMN Georg Muller Nurnberg AG v. U.S., 15 C.I.T. 174, 178 (1991).
222
See Statement of Administrative Action on the Uruguay Round, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at
829 (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(b)(1) (2012); Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. U.S., 88 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (“[The DOC] . . . reasonably placed the burden to establish entitlement to adjustments on .
. . the party seeking the adjustment and the party with access to the necessary information.”).
223
Section 777A(f)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1), states that the DOC
is to reduce the antidumping duty if it finds that the countervailable subsidy has been demonstrated
to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant
period. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) (2006).
217

163

SUMMER 2014

Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest

However given the DOC’s interpretation that the initial burden of
showing pass-through of a countervailable subsidy to lower export prices
is on the respondent, they should be accorded deference. This
interpretation is also consistent with other aspects of an AD or CVD
investigation where respondents have the burden of proof of
demonstrating facts for which they have greater access to the relevant
evidence. For example, demonstrating the absence of central government
control in order to receive a company-specific rate in a NME AD
investigation. 224 It is reasonable to require a respondent to demonstrate
that a subsidy is passed through to lower export prices, rather than
assume that all domestic subsidies are passed through and require the
DOC to make an automatic adjustment for all countervailable subsidies
in concurrent AD/CVD investigations. The investigations that the DOC
has conducted demonstrate that not all subsidies received are used to
lower export prices. Those subsidies, which do not lower export prices,
do not implicate a double counting problem necessitating an adjustment
to the dumping margin.225
Considering the extreme difficulty of measuring the price effect of
domestic subsidies,226 it could be argued that it is not reasonable to place
the burden of proof on the respondent. However, this argument ignores
the fact that the burden of proving the difficult portion of the estimation
methodology is actually borne by the DOC. The DOC has the burden of
reasonably estimating the extent to which the subsidy increased the
weighted average dumping margin.227
Based on investigations concerning implementing 19 U.S.C. §
1677f-1(f), it is reasonable to allocate the initial burden of proof to
respondents. Respondents should show that a countervailable subsidy has
a demonstrable cost-price linkage because they are in the best position to
identify which of the countervailable subsidies affect their COM.
Moreover, putting the burden of proof on respondents does not impose
unreasonable hardship above and beyond what is already required of
them in an ordinary AD or CVD investigation.
In cases where a respondent fails to provide adequate evidence to
allow the DOC to verify that a countervailable subsidy is passed-through
to lower export prices, it is reasonable for the DOC to decline to make an
adjustment under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C). The party that has the
burden of proof must create an adequate record, 228 and it is not the
DOC’s obligation to “seek out” information from the respondent.229 If a
respondent only meets its burden of demonstrating that a subsidy reduced
the average import price with respect to certain types of subsidies, the
DOC is not obligated to seek out information showing what effect the


224

See Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co., Ltd. v. U.S., 710 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010).
See Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22.
226
See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
227
19 U.S.C. § 1677f–1(f)(1)(C) (2006).
228
See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. U.S., 16 C.I.T. 931, 936 (1992).
229
See id. at 936.
225
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other subsidies had on average import price.
The weakest aspect of the methodology the DOC uses to make
adjustments under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f) is a portion of the estimation
methodology, § 1677f-1(f)(1)(C), where the DOC attempts to reasonably
estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. This estimation
methodology the DOC has used in this phase of the adjustment process is
may not be reasonable because it utilizes manufacturing sector-wide data
as opposed to firm-specific data. This results in an estimation based on
aggregate price indices rather than the effect of the actual subsidy
received by the respondent. In the Section 129 reviews, the DOC did not
consider the actual effect of a specific subsidy, looking instead to
average changes in an input price index. Additionally, the DOC did not
limit its analysis to the impact on import prices of like merchandise.
Instead it looked to changes in an aggregate producer, post-factory price
index comprised of data from all manufacturing sectors in China.230 The
DOC used a similar methodology in the Stainless Steel Kitchen Sinks
investigation, when it applied a Chinese manufacturing sector-wide ratio
to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through.231
Courts have found that the use of aggregate estimates is
unreasonable in the face of clear legislative intent to the contrary in other
circumstances, for example in valuing the labor factor of production in
NME AD investigations.232 In Dorbest v. United States, the CAFC held
that the DOC’s methodology of valuing the labor factor of production
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) using a regression-based wage rate
calculated with data from market economy countries was not
reasonable.233 The statute demonstrates Congress’s clear intent to require
the use of data solely from economically comparable countries234 that are
significant producers of comparable merchandise,235 which the regression
methodology failed to do.236
Similarly, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(f)(1)(B) states that a subsidy must be
demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or
kind of merchandise during the relevant period. This shows clear
legislative intent to have the relevant reduction in average prices be
caused by a subsidy and limited to imports of like merchandise. The
methodology the DOC used was overly broad because it used an input
price index as a proxy for a subsidy. Moreover, it used cost and price
data for the entire manufacturing sector as a proxy for the average price
of the like product produced by individual respondents. Therefore, this
methodology likely underestimated the impact of the relevant subsidies


230

See Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 179, at 9–10.
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22.
232
See Dorbest Ltd. v. U.S., 30 C.I.T. 1671, 1703í11 (2006).
233
Dorbest Ltd. v. U.S., 604 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
234
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A) (2006).
235
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(B) (2006).
236
Dorbest, 604 F.3d at 1371–72.
231
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on import prices.237
c. Applicability of Facts Available. The DOC could justify its passthrough estimation methodology as reasonable and in accordance with
law by relying on the facts available. The DOC may use “facts otherwise
available” to make a determination if necessary information is not
available in the record or if an interested party withholds or fails to
provide such information. 238 In the Stainless Steel Kitchen Sinks
investigation The DOC stated that the respondents failed to provide
adequate information to calculate company-specific estimates of the
extent of subsidy pass-through.239 This suggests that the application of
facts available is reasonable and justifies the use of an aggregate
manufacturing sector proxy. This conclusion is supported by the text of
the statute, which only requires that the DOC make an adjustment if it
can reasonably estimate the extent to which a countervailable subsidy has
increased the weighted average dumping margin.240 In light of the text,
the DOC could have declined to make an adjustment altogether after
concluding the information provided by the respondents was inadequate
to reasonably estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through.
B. WTO Consistency of P.L. 112-99
1. Text of P.L. 112-99
Public Law 112-99 could alternatively be challenged at the DSB of
the WTO, however, a challenge in this forum would likely be
unsuccessful. The statute is ‘as such’ consistent with the WTO
Agreements and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD. Section
2(a), which requires the DOC to make reasonable efforts to determine if
a subsidy reduced the export price and then reduce the weighted average
dumping margin by the amount of the subsidy, is consistent ‘as such’
with Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body stated that
in order to be consistent with Article 19.3, the DOC must attempt “to



237
If the reduction in import prices resulting from the subsidies is underestimated, the amount
by which the subsidies increase the weighted average dumping will also be underestimated. This
results in less than the full amount of duplicative remedies being adjusted for. See 19 U.S.C. §
1677f-1(f)(2) (2006).
238
See Gerber Food (Yunnan) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 921, 937–38 (2007).
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a), the DOC may use facts otherwise available if, (1) necessary
information is not available on the record, or (2) an interested party or any other person - (A)
withholds information that has been requested by the administering authority or the Commission
under this subtitle, (B) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the
information or in the form and manner requested, (C) significantly impedes a proceeding under this
subtitle, or (D) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided as
provided in section 1677m(i) of this title. If the DOC finds that an interested party has failed to
cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information, the DOC
may use adverse inferences in selecting from among the facts available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)
(2006).
239
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 177, at 22.
240
See § 777A(f)(1)(A)–(C) of the Act.
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establish whether or to what degree it would offset the same subsidies
twice by imposing antidumping duties calculated under its NME
methodology, concurrently with countervailing duties.” 241 Section 2(a)
directs the DOC to reduce the AD by the amount that a countervailable
subsidy, that has been demonstrated to reduce the average price of
imports of like merchandise, has increased the weighted average
dumping margin. The investigation provided for in Section 2(a) is
consistent with the type of inquiry the Appellate Body concluded that the
DOC should have undertaken in US-AD/CVD.242 However, the DOC’s
implementation of Section 2(a) is more susceptible to challenge as
inconsistent with GATT Article 19.3.
2. Offsetting Methodology of P.L. 112-99
While the DOC’s offsetting methodology would likely be upheld
both in U.S. court and in WTO dispute settlement, several factors make
the latter determination a much closer call. These factors include a
standard of review that accords no deference to the investigating
authority, the allocation of the burden of proof between the investigating
authority and the respondent, and the potential applicability of the
doctrine of facts available.
a. Standard of Review. The standard of review under the AntiDumping Agreement is more stringent than that applied under U.S. law.
It asks whether a national authority’s establishment of facts was proper
and unbiased and whether the investigating authority’s interpretation of
the relevant WTO provision was permissible. 243 Similar to Chevron
deference, this standard suggests that even if the panel would have
reached a different decision from that reached by the investigating
authority, it could still find that the standard is met. However, in practice
panels tend to find there is only one possible interpretation of the
Agreement, giving no deference to Member interpretations with which
they disagree.244


241

AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 604.
See id.
243
Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 17.6.
244
In United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, the Appellate Body found that Article 17.6(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement’s reference
to ‘permissible interpretation’ refers to interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, which is permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶¶ 59–60,(July 24, 2001). In practice, applying the
pertinent rules of the Vienna Convention, panels have consistently found there is but one way to
interpret the text. See Appellate Body Report, US–Stainless Steel (Mexico), ¶ 136, WT/DS344/R
(Dec. 20, 2007) (“In our analysis, we have been mindful of the standard of review provided in
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, we consider that Article VI:2 of the
GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, when interpreted in accordance with
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law as required by the first sentence of
Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, do not admit of another interpretation as far as the
242
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b. Burden of Proof. A WTO panel or the Appellate Body would
likely allocate the burden of showing whether a subsidy reduces import
price to the United States. The Appellate Body in US-AD/CVD did not
specifically address which party, the investigating authority or the
respondent, has the burden of showing that a subsidy reduces import
price, butt its analysis suggests it would place the burden of proof on the
investigating authority. 245 The Appellate Body stated that the
investigating authority has an affirmative obligation to ascertain the
precise amount of the subsidy and to establish the appropriate amount of
the duty under Article 19.3:
This obligation encompasses a requirement to conduct a
sufficiently diligent "investigation" into, and solicitation
of, relevant facts, and to base its determination on
positive evidence in the record . . . [including] evidence
of whether and to what degree the same subsidies are
being offset twice when anti-dumping and
countervailing duties are simultaneously imposed on the
same imported products.246
This statement can be interpreted as putting the burden of soliciting
evidence of the subsidy-import price link on the investigating authority
and the burden of providing that evidence on the respondent, as the DOC
alleges.247 However, a panel or the Appellate Body would likely place
the ultimate burden of demonstrating that a subsidy reduced the average
import price and therefore resulted in duplicative remedies on the
investigating authority, using the evidence provided by the respondent.
The standard for whether the DOC’s offsetting methodology is
consistent with Article 19.3 is whether the DOC has taken the necessary
corrective steps to adjust for duplicative remedies 248 by conducting a
sufficiently diligent investigation and soliciting evidence. 249 In the
Section 129 reviews in US-Softwood Lumber IV,250 the Appellate Body
upheld a Panel decision finding that the U.S. had failed to conduct an
adequate pass-through analysis of subsidies in transactions involving
unrelated parties. 251 This reasoning was justified because the DOC
solicited company-specific, transaction-by-transaction information from
the Canadian respondents with respect to some transactions 252 but not


issue of zeroing raised in this appeal is concerned.”).
245
See AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 602.
246
See id.
247
Final Determination Section 129 – OTR Tires, supra note 194, at 18.
248
See AD/CVD AB Report, supra note 98, ¶ 599.
249
See id. ¶ 602.
250
Article 21.5 Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/RW (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter USSoftwood Lumber IV].
251
See id. ¶¶ 4.58–4.62.
252
See id. ¶ 4.83.
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others.253
The Panel held 254 that the DOC’s failure to investigate the passthrough in respect of all the relevant transactions, specifically those
transactions for which no data was requested, was a failure to properly
implement the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body.255 Interestingly,
the Panel resisted making categorical statements as to the sufficiency of
using aggregate data versus company-specific or transaction-specific
data to analyze the pass-through effect of a subsidy.256 Similarly, in the
Section 129 reviews conducted following US-AD/CVD, the DOC’s
investigation was not sufficient because its attempts to solicit evidence of
duplicative remedies were not specific to the firms that received the
subsidies. After failing to receive satisfactory responses from the
GOC,257 the DOC failed to make additional requests for information and
instead relied on a publicly-available report that did not address the price
effect of subsidies other than input subsidies.258 In contrast, in the Drawn
Stainless Steel Sinks and Hardwood and Decorative Plywood
investigations, the DOC did request information from the individual
mandatory respondents regarding which of the subsidies under
investigation impacted their cost of manufacturing and the cost-linked
price changes resulting from the subsidies under investigation.259 As a
result, the investigations conducted subsequent to the Section 129
reviews meet the standard of a sufficiently diligent investigation, at least
with regard to the initial burden of demonstrating that the countervailable
subsidies reduce export prices.
As previously discussed, this phase of the offsetting methodology,
involving the use an estimate as a proxy for subsidy pass-through, is
more problematic. In order for the DOC’s implementation of Section
2(a) of P.L. 112-99 to comply with US-AD/CVD, The DOC must
investigate the price-effect of each subsidy under investigation and
thereby determine whether an adjustment for duplicative remedies is
necessary. 260 By applying an aggregate price proxy for the
countervailable subsidies and only considering manufacturing sector
level data, the DOC arguably did not adequately account for the pass



253
See id. ¶ 4.104. The Canadian respondents provided aggregate data for the transactions for
which data was requested. Id. ¶ 4.83. Canada alleged that the DOC presumed pass-through for the
transactions for which no data was requested. Id. ¶¶ 4.93–4.94.
254
The Panel’s Article 21.5 Report was appealed to the Appellate Body by the U.S. The appeal
challenged whether the Panel’s First Assessment Review was within the scope of Article 21.5.
However, it did not challenge the substance of the pass-through analysis in the First Assessment
Review. Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, ¶ 96. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s
determination that the First Assessment Review fell within the scope of Article 21.5. Id. ¶ 95.
255
Id. ¶ 4.106.
256
See id. ¶¶ 4.88–4.89.
257
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 194, at 8.
258
Id. at 9.
259
Preliminary Determination – Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 163, at 22.
260
Under US-Softwood Lumber IV, the aggregate data methodology utilized by the DOC might
have been sufficient had it specifically accounted for each challenged subsidy; however, the
conclusion that only input subsidies impact average import prices is not supported by record
evidence.
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through of each challenged subsidy and potentially applied duplicative
remedies. However, as in the analysis under U.S. law, the DOC’s
estimation methodology for subsidy pass-through could be consistent
with Article 19.3 and the Appellate Body decision in US-AD/CVD if the
doctrine of facts available applies.
c. Applicability of Facts Available. The second phase of the
offsetting methodology is consistent with Article 19.3 and the AB
decision in US-AD/CVD due to the applicability of facts available.
Neither US-AD/CVD nor Canada-Softwood Lumber IV addressed the
issue of when a Member may resort to using aggregate or proxy data
when the information provided by respondents is not deemed sufficient
to estimate the extent of subsidy pass-through. The relevant provision of
the Antidumping Agreement is Article 6.8, which states:
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to,
or otherwise does not provide, necessary information
within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the
investigation, preliminary and final determinations,
affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the
facts available. The provisions of Annex II(402) shall be
observed in the application of this paragraph.
The applicability of facts available is narrower under WTO
jurisprudence than it is under U.S. law. For example, under U.S. law, the
DOC may find that a respondent who failed to provide information that
was not specifically requested but which the respondent should have
known was necessary to an investigation impeded that investigation,
thereby justifying the application of facts available. 261 In contrast, in
Argentina-Ceramic Tiles, the Panel held that, “an investigating authority
may not fault an interested party for not providing information it was not
clearly requested to submit.”262


261

See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 1416, 1423 (2007).
Panel Report, Argentina — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Carton-Board Imports
from Germany and Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Tiles from Italy, ¶
6.54 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Argentina-Ceramic Tiles]. See also id. ¶ 6.55 (“Paragraph 1 of
Annex II of the [Anti-Dumping] Agreement on the ‘Use of Best Information Available in Terms of
Paragraph 8 of Article 6’ reiterates the obligation of Article 6.1. It states that: 1. As soon as possible
after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating authorities should specify in detail the
information required from any interested party, and the manner in which that information should be
structured by the interested party in its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is
aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to
make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in the application
for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.’ Thus, the first sentence of paragraph
1 requires the investigating authority to ‘specify in detail the information required,’ while the second
sentence requires it to inform interested parties that, if information is not supplied within a
reasonable time, the authorities may make determinations on the basis of the facts available. In our
view, the inclusion, in an Annex relating specifically to the use of best information available under
Article 6.8, of a requirement to specify in detail the information required, strongly implies that
investigating authorities are not entitled to resort to best information available in a situation where a
262
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Due to the DOC’s inadequate efforts to solicit information, the DOC
could not justify the results of the Section 129 reviews based on facts
available. However, the DOC’s efforts in the subsequent investigations
do meet the standard necessary for applying facts available. In the
Section 129 reviews, the DOC requested industry-level information from
the GOC, but concluded that the responses were inadequate.263 Due to
time constraints, rather than make additional requests for information,
the DOC based its determination on other information on the record, akin
to invoking facts available.264
In contrast, in the Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks investigation, the
DOC requested information from the individual respondents and made
subsequent requests for information in an attempt to calculate companyspecific pass through rates before resorting to applying the
manufacturing sector-wide rate to estimate subsidy pass through. 265
Given that the DOC investigated manufacturers individually, requested
information relating to specific subsidies, and chose to utilize an
aggregate estimate, the application of facts available is reasonable.
Consequently, the investigation in Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks is more
likely to meet the standard of sufficiently diligent than that conducted in
the Section 129 reviews, regardless of the fact that the DOC eventually
resorted to utilizing the same imprecise proxy mechanism to estimate
pass-through in both investigations.
VIII. IMPACT OF SUNSETTING PROVISION IN CHINA’S ACCESSION
PROTOCOL
It is also worth noting that the issue of double counting will likely
become moot with respect to China in 2016 when, under the terms of
China’s accession to the WTO, China’s non-market economy status is set
to expire. Article 15 of China’s Accession Protocol permits importing
Members to treat China as a non-market economy in antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations if certain conditions are met.266 Article
15(d) of the Accession Protocol states:
Once China has established, under the national law of
the importing WTO Member, that it is a market
economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be
terminated provided that the importing Member's


party does not provide certain information if the authorities failed to specify in detail the information
which was required.”).
263
Section 129 Determination – OTR Tires, supra note 165, at 7-8.
264
Id. at 8–9.
265
Issues Final Determination – Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks, supra note 177, at 5.
266
See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Art. 15, WT/L/432 (Nov.
23, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/379abr_e.pdf; Yaling Zhang,
The Link Between Countervailing Duty Investigations and Non-Market Economy Status in Light of
United States: Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,
19 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 13, 15 (2010).
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national law contains market economy criteria as of the
date of accession. In any event, the provisions of
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date
of accession.267
However, the obligation under Article 15 is not as all encompassing
as some commentators have suggested. Article 15(d), the provision in
China’s Accession Protocol that provides for China’s NME status to
expire in 2016refers specifically to another provision, Article 15(a)(ii),
which by its own terms applies only to AD investigations. In practice this
means that Article 15 will eliminate the DOC’s flexibility in AD
investigations to select a surrogate country benchmark. This resolves the
double counting problem that arises due to the calculation of a dumping
margin using a surrogate country. However, the provision does not
require the United States to fully recognize China as a NME country.
Consequently, the decision whether to alter China’s NME status will
remain subject to the discretion of the DOC,268 which is unlikely to elect
to alter China’s NME status without significant evidence of relevant
reform.269
Given the applicability of Article 15, the issue of double counting
due to concurrent application of CVDs and NME ADs with respect to
China could be moot as of 2016. However, this assumes that the DOC
ceases utilizing the NME AD methodology, based on surrogate country
values, and does not replace it with a methodology that gives rise to the
same issues. It should also be noted that the DOC has begun conducting
concurrent CVD and NME AD investigations with respect to products
from Vietnam. 270 Since Vietnam did not negotiate a comparable
provision to Article 15 in China’s Accession Protocol when it acceded to
the WTO, there is no restriction on the DOC’s continued application of
its concurrent CVD-NME AD methodology to Vietnam, or any other
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Id.
See, e.g., Christian Tietje and Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy
Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016, POLICY PAPERS ON TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW NO. 34, Dec. 2011, at 7.
269
The DOC reviewed China’s NME status in 2006 and determined that while China has
implemented significant economic reforms with respect to some of the factors, the market forces in
China were not yet sufficiently developed for the DOC to changes its status as a NME country. Id. at
5. The DOC focused particularly on the fifth factor, government control of the allocation of
resources, concluding that the GOC was still deeply entrenched in resource allocation, particularly in
the banking sector. Id. at 77. Based on its 2006 analysis, the DOC would likely require evidence of
significant economic and legal reforms in order to reach a different conclusion with respect to
China’s NME status. Id. at 81 (“Firms in industries that are dominated by the private sector also
operate in a business environment distorted by state presence and the weakness–or absence–of the
legal and institutional factors that underlie functioning markets, e.g., rule of law and property rights,
and meaningful bankruptcy laws.”); see Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology
under U.S. Anti-Dumping Laws: A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 81, 87 (2006).
270
See, e.g., Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 77
Fed. Reg. 75, 973 (Dec. 26, 2012) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination); Certain
Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 77 Fed. Reg. 75,980 (Dec. 26,
2012) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
268

172

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 10

NME countries, post-2016. Consequently, double counting will continue
to be an issue of contention when the DOC conducts concurrent AD and
CVD investigations involving products from NME countries.
IX. CONCLUSION
Avoiding duplicative trade remedies in the concurrent application of
NME AD and CVD is a complicated issue. Public Law 112-99
adequately addresses the issue of double counting by requiring the DOC
to determine in concurrent AD/CVD investigations whether or not
countervailable subsidies are passed through to reduce export price and
adjust the dumping margin accordingly. This resolves the issue of double
counting because only subsidies that are passed through to reduce export
price have an impact on the dumping margin and consequently would
give rise to duplicative remedies.
The statute also satisfies the standards laid out in both the U.S. court
decisions in the GPX cases and the WTO Appellate Body decision in
US-AD/CVD, ensuring that the United States is in compliance with its
international obligations under the GATT and its associated agreements.
Depending on how the DOC chooses to implement the obligation in the
sunsetting provision in China’s Accession Protocol to stop applying the
NME AD methodology after 2016, the double counting issue may
disappear with respect to China. However, the DOC is likely to take a
narrow approach in interpreting the extent to which the sunsetting
provision limits its ability to utilize NME methodologies. For example,
calculating the normal value based on a surrogate country factors of
production, such that there will still be a potential for duplicative
remedies. Additionally, the DOC has already begun applying CVD
duties to the other major U.S. trading partner currently treated as a NME
country, Vietnam. This means it is all the more important for the DOC to
improve its adjustment methodology. More specifically, in order to
remain in compliance with the United States’ WTO obligations, the
methodology can be improved by refining the estimating subsidy passthrough to allow for the calculation of firm-specific pass through rates of
individual firms for individual subsidies.
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